

MEMORANDUM FOR: E. H. Knoche

*HK July 1/6*

1. FYI

2. Please note para 9.

3. My remarks to NIOs and other DDI and DDO colleagues have stressed the requirement for direct and personal support to the DCI in a crisis. This support should be channeled through the task force for maximum efficiency.

*Vince Heyman*  
*Some good suggestions.*  
*any comments?*

Date July 1, 1976

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July 1, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: William K. Parmenter [redacted]  
FROM : [redacted]  
SUBJECT : The Lebanon Evacuation Task Force

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Introduction

1. The Lebanon Evacuation Task Force was activated at approximately 1130 on Friday the 18th of June. My association with it began upon my return to Headquarters from [redacted] at 1330 that day. The next two days provided all of us valuable experience with the new Task Force area and the support procedures developed for it. We also received some indications of problems likely to be faced by both CIA Task Forces and National Task Forces in the future. The views of some of my colleagues on the task force were solicited for this memorandum but the judgments are largely my own.

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The Physical Arrangements

2. The floor space was adequate for this task force but some rearrangement of furniture, functions, and facilities will be necessary to achieve greater efficiency for a CIA task force. In the event of a national task force, with representation from other intelligence agencies, there will not be enough space in the present task force area for a satisfactory operation.

3. The furniture in the task force area should be rearranged to reduce congestion in the aisles, allow the free flow of traffic around the message tube station; locate the message traffic sorting table in a more central position, position the shift chief so he can observe the activities in the room, and provide a briefing and conference area where it will not interfere with the analysts.

4. The telephone arrangements are generally satisfactory. Improvements could be made in terms of support for the conference and briefing area as well as providing a telephone console for the shift chief and his administrative assistant (this position is explained in para 9). The details of these

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communications arrangements are dependent upon the specific locations and space allocated to the briefing area and the shift chief. In general terms, however, the following changes should be made:

- grey phones should each have two numbers, so that adjoining analyst positions can join in conversations with outside parties
- identical telephone consoles on the desks of the shift chief, the administrative assistant, and the director of the task force; these consoles to carry the black and red lines allocated to the task force as well as the direct line to the Operations Center.
- simplified instruction cards for use of combined grey/green phones to be posted at each analyst station with prefixes for locations frequently called
- telephone array at side of briefing/conference area to include grey/green, direct White House, black/red console and with speaker for each. There may be a requirement for duplication on two sides of conference area.

5. The production function of the task force should be located away from the analysts' stations. In this instance, a separate room was available that provided the required space and protected the analysts from the noise and bustle of manuscript and cable preparation. We note that this room will be turned to other use in the next year.

Organization of Task Force

6. Each situation requiring an intelligence task force will be different and we should expect to change our organization from time to time. There are, however, some observations that should be discussed here.

7. It has been my experience that underestimating personnel requirements is more common than not and that leads me to note that it is easier to reduce excess staff than to add people to an organization in the midst of a crisis.

8. Most of the task force personnel came from the MEA division of OCI, supplemented by geographic and functional

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specialists from other offices as was necessary. The appropriate talents were assembled quickly and in approximately the correct quantities. The cooperation extended to OCI by OSR and OER was splendid. Invaluable support was provided by Operations Center personnel in operating the message tube system, coordinating with the Operations Center, assisting with the printing and dissemination of the Sit Rep and cable, and providing cars and drivers for the task force. The knowledge, planning, and positive attitude of the Operations Center people allowed us to devote our scarce analytical talent to the substantive problems. Operations Center support of this type is essential to the success of any task force.

9. In the Lebanon Task Force we produced a periodic situation report and provided direct briefing and assistance to the DCI and the NIO. Initially, we were not properly organized for both of these tasks. We concentrated upon the situation report and were not prepared to provide the personal briefing support to the DCI for the first few hours. We should consider an organization that allows us to meet both responsibilities simultaneously. Suggested improvements to the physical arrangements were discussed in paras 2-5. Duties should be assigned as follows:

-- Director of Task Force: Division Chief or his deputy acting on behalf of Director, OCI to provide overall supervision of task force; to insure administrative support for the task force; to mesh the task force operation into the activities of the Community, State, and DoD by direct personal action; to coordinate task force activities with NIO and DCI. The relative importance of this position will decline after the first day or so when the task force develops an operating rhythm.

-- Assistant Director of Task Force: the Branch Chief most directly concerned with the crisis, acting on behalf of Task Force Director to organize the analytic effort and to directly supervise the production of the Sit Rep and the cable; he also will serve as principal briefer for the DCI, NIO, and senior visitors to the task force area.

-- Shift Leaders: will usually be selected from among the more senior and experienced analysts and branch chiefs in the OCI Division directly concerned; will provide themes for major sections of Sit Rep on his shift,

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will draft significant sections of Sit Rep, and provide initial editing; will act for Assistant Director of Task Force in his absence.

-- Administrative Assistant: (new position) selected for alertness and general DDI experience, to assist Shift Leader by maintaining task force log, reproduce and distribute significant messages, and act as back-up to the Operations Center person operating message tubes.

-- Operations Center Liaison and Support: one person per shift selected by Ops Ctr to operate message tubes; coordinate support from Ops Ctr, motor pool, cable secretariat and reproduction facilities.

-- DDO Liaison: this function usually can be fulfilled by the DDO/DO and by telephone contact with the division; in some instances, especially when the DCI is working out of the task force, it will be more efficient to locate a DDO liaison officer in the task force. The Lebanon Task Force clearly demonstrated the advantages, to all parties, of having a senior DDO liaison officer in the task force when the DCI was present for extended periods.

-- Secretarial support: one typist with production experience, capable of using IBM Memory or MTST to be on duty at all times.

-- Other support: the support provided by NPIC, IAS, and OGCR throughout the Lebanon Task Force was exemplary. The task force would get off to a faster start if OGCR had a representative on duty in the task force area for the first day or two.

Internal  
of 16 July -  
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